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# DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET - [redacted]

PROCESSING ACTION
XX MARKED FOR INDEXING
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MICROFILM

MICROFILMED
APR 2 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO: Chief, EE

INFO: Chief, WE; Chief of Base, Bonn; COS, Germany; CSB, Frankfurt; COS, [redacted]

FROM: Chief of Station, [redacted]

SUBJECT: DIZTAG [redacted] CAVATA Operational
Identification of CIS agent met in Verviers, Belgium.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: [redacted] 8032

1. Introduction. The [redacted] quick reaction to [redacted] information, together with some lucky guess-work, have resulted in the identification of a West German national serving as a Czech I.S. agent. The case is an unusual one, in that the agent is met only about once per year, and the meetings, although planned and counter-surveilled by the CIS residentura in The Hague, are in Verviers, Belgium, the agent himself crossing the German-Belgian border by train and returning to Germany the same day. CAVATA investigation of the agent is now in progress, in order to gain current information on his activities and access. The delay in submitting this report was due to initial [redacted] reluctance to share CAVATA data identifying the agent; we have now obtained the information on the condition that CAVATA must not learn of our knowledge of the case.

2. [redacted] reporting. CIS staff officer Stanislav SROUBEK [redacted] arrived at Schiphol at 1200 hours 16 February 1965 (source: [redacted]. [redacted] reported a lengthy conversation that evening between SROUBEK and Hague CIS residentura officers Oldrich JONES [redacted] and Rudolph BALOUN [redacted] Little of the conversation could be recovered, but the audible portions concerned two apparently unrelated operational missions:

a. Friday 19 February JONES was to drive to an unknown location beyond Groningen where he was to have a meeting with an unknown person on 16 March. It appeared from this excerpt that the 19 February trip, to be made together with Josef RUT [redacted] would be for casing purposes. Subsequent [redacted] surveillance

Attachments:
3 [redacted] reports (2 cys of each)

Distribution:
2 - EE w/atts h/w
2 - WE w/atts h/w
1 - COB, Bonn wo/atts
1 - COS/G/B w/o atts
1 - CSB/Fran w/o [redacted]

(CONTINUED)

[redacted]

CROSS REFERENCE TO:
1 - [redacted] w/o atts
2 - [redacted] w/atts

BRANCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: [redacted]-30316

DATE: 26 March 1965

D, 51-8-1

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET - [redacted]

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-[redacted] (PFAFF)

revealed that JONES did not make the casing trip on 19 February, but he was surveilled together with Jiri KOREC [ ] on an operational mission of some sort to Groningen on 16 March (see [ ] 30317).

b. On Saturday 20 February, JONES, BALOUN and SROUBEK would drive together in JONES' car to an unspecified city for a clandestine meeting. SROUBEK expected to talk to the agent for about four hours. The group would leave The Hague just before eight o'clock in the morning, in order to allow enough time for the meeting the agent was to return to his place of residence (also unspecified) the same day. The place where the meeting was to be held was about three hours' driving time from The Hague. SROUBEK referred to meeting the agent only once per year. Later excerpts from the same conversation referred to a "German," some sort of business representative, presumably of a Berlin firm and of Philips products as well. Several sentences from this conversation contained hints as to landmarks at the meeting site, RR station, hotel, restaurant, etc. In a later conversation with Ambassador ZILKA, SROUBEK commented that he would be going to Belgium and would be returning to the CSSR the following week. [ ] reporting shows that SROUBEK flew back to Prague from Schiphol at 1305 hours 23 February 1965.

3. Identification of meeting-site. Immediately alerted by Lester E. Puddley, [ ] studied the transcript and gathered with some of his colleagues to make plans. They recalled that SROUBEK, JONES and BALOUN had once previously made a trip together for some unknown purpose, staying in the Grand Hotel Europe in Verviers, Belgium. This trip had taken place on 27 April 1963, and was reported in [ ] 27239, 22 November 1963. [ ] went to Verviers the next morning, 18 February 1965. to check the local scene against the indicators reported by [ ] Finding that Verviers was undoubtedly to be the meeting site, [ ] contacted the [ ] to organize surveillance.

4. Surveillance results on 20 February. Observers at the [ ] observation point in The Hague observed JONES, SROUBEK and BALOUN leaving the Legation building early in the morning of the 20th. At 1215 hours, the combined [ ], [ ] surveillance in Verviers spotted their CD car entering Verviers. They parked the car at the railroad station, then split up and entered the center of town on foot. With BALOUN and JONES providing counter-surveillance, SROUBEK picked up an unknown individual at the Grand Hotel Europa and took him to a cafe. JONES and BALOUN stood in front of the cafe for fifteen minutes to check against hostile surveillance, then withdrew to another cafe where they ordered coffee. In the meantime, SROUBEK conducted a two-and-a-half hour conversation with the unknown agent, and was observed to also accept some papers from him. Following their meeting, they split up and the agent was observed walking to the railroad station and boarding a train bound for Cologne. The surveillance team accompanied him on this trip, and arranged for the customs officials on the train to spot-check passports, including that of the agent. In this manner, the full identity and other data used by the agent on this trip was obtained. The surveillance was dropped in Cologne after the agent boarded a train bound for Frankfurt/Main. According to [ ] the agent gave no signs of having detected that he was under surveillance.

5. Identity of agent. The Belgian border authorities identified the man under surveillance as:

Wernfried PFAFF
DPOB: 14 February 1915, Brandau, Czechoslovakia
Res : unknown
Occ : unknown.

CAVATA was immediately asked for traces and replied with the following information: PFAFF was captured by the Soviets at the end of the Second World War and, after an initial period in a Soviet POW camp, turned him over to the Czechs in May 1945 for trial on charges connected with his activities as a Sicherheitsdienst Obersturmfuehrer in Czechoslovakia during the war. The Czech court sentenced him to twenty years in prison. PFAFF was amnestied with the general amnesty of 1955, released from custody and allowed to travel to West Germany. CAVATA records show that under interrogation at that time PFAFF claimed to have refused a recruitment attempt by the Soviets while a Soviet POW, although other men in the same camp reported that PFAFF was conspicuously better treated than other prisoners. PFAFF further stated that he had also been approached by the Czechs while in their custody and had refused, although another former prisoner of the Czechs also amnestied in 1955 told CAVATA that after his own recruitment by the Czechs he was put into a special hotel for post-recruitment handling and that he had seen PFAFF in the same hotel, strongly indicating that PFAFF too had accepted recruitment. CAVATA has no recent information on PFAFF in their files, and is unaware of PFAFF's current residence and occupation. They have initiated a discreet investigation, and any further results obtained will be forwarded upon receipt.

6. COB/Bonn: As it is possible that CAVATA will ask for traces on Subject, we would appreciate your being on the alert for any such development and reporting any significant information obtained from CAVATA. You should not, however, reveal any awareness of this case, which was surfaced to CAVATA by the [redacted] in such a manner as to protect [redacted] CAVATA has not been told of any KUBARK role to date, and the [redacted] stipulated to the undersigned that CAVATA must not become aware of our knowledge of this information.

7. COS/[redacted] While we would appreciate notification of any information the [redacted] may pass to the Station, we request that you not reveal awareness of this case in discussions with them. The [redacted] handled their dealings with the [redacted] in such a manner as to cover up the source of their lead, and have not informed the [redacted] of KUBARK's involvement.

8. EE, WE: Attached are [redacted] transcripts covering SROUBEK, BALOUN and JONES conversations, for your further analysis and disposition.

9. The [redacted] cryptonym for this case is [redacted]

[redacted]